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This paper means to add to empirical research on the impact of local loop unbundling (LLU) 
on broadband networks. In particular, it focuses on broadband investment made by entrants.  
Starting from late Nineties telecommunications incumbents of several European Union 
countries have been required to unbundle their local loops. While there is a general consensus 
on the negative or null impact of unbundling obligations on incumbents’ investment, research 
on the relationship between LLU and new entrants’ investment, albeit growing, has not yet 
reached a coherent body of results. We have tested two propositions. First, service-based 
entry, which relies on LLU, paves the way to new entrants’ subsequent investment in 
broadband systems (i.e. ladder of investment theory). Second, the price charged for local loop 
should increase over time in order to have a significant investment in alternative platforms 
(i.e. the transitory entry assistance theory). The empirical analysis is carried out on a sample 
of 27 European countries (2002-2009 period). We have collected country-level data on 
broadband lines and LLU policy indicators. The preliminary results suggest that service-based 
entry does not lead entrants to a subsequent facility-based entry, casting some doubts on the 
ladder of investment theory. The “short ladder” version of the theory has received 
confirmation instead. At the same time, an increasing price of local loop is not found to 
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1. Introduction 
Starting from late Nineties, the telecommunications incumbents of several European 
Union countries have been required to unbundle their local loops. In 2001 the European 
Commission issued a regulation to make local loop unbundling (LLU) compulsory in Member 
States. LLU obligations have been mainly motivated by the view that the importance and 
complexity of network modernization investments and the dominance of historical operators 
would have resulted in a slow progress of facility-based competition. In fact, LLU can be seen 
as a transitory measure. It is expected to help new entrants to increase their customer base, 
which in turn is regarded as a necessary condition to develop own networks in a second phase. 
This paper means to add to empirical research on this topic, addressing the impact of LLU on 
the development of broadband networks by the new entrants.  
Broadband networks continue attracting the attention of experts because they are 
expected to enhance productivity and to facilitate product innovation (Koutroumpis, 2009). 
E.g. broadband infrastructure plays a relevant role in the stimulus packages that some 
countries have adopted to bolster recovery after the recent economic crisis (Qiang, 2009). The 
current issue among regulators and policymakers around the world is how to favor the 
deployment of high-speed (“superfast”) broadband systems, i.e. fiber networks that should 
progressively replace the current copper telecommunications networks. Indeed, by June 2010, 
DSL was still the leading broadband technology, accounting for 61% of total broadband 
subscribers, while cable and fiber customers amounted respectively to 23% and 7% (OECD, 
2010). An effective design of measures that can foster the switch to high-speed is a complex 
task. However, it can be argued that it requires a better understanding of the effects of LLU up 
to now. In this paper, firstly, we test if a preliminary phase of service-based competition has 
helped the development of facility-based competition in a subsequent phase. This is what 
predicts the ladder of investment theory proposed by Cave and Vogelsang (2003), Cave 
(2006). Secondly, we investigate the relationship between the price of the local loop and 3 
 
broadband investment. Indeed, as Cave and Vogelsang (2003) point out, in order to spur 
facility-based competition, “transitory entry assistance” should not be limited to the obligation 
to lease unbundled network elements, but should encompass access charge increasing over 
time, i.e. a critical instrument to give the right incentives to invest.  
  The empirical analysis is carried out on a sample of 27 European countries observed 
from 2002 to 2009. From reports provided by European Commission, we have collected data 
on the total numbers of broadband lines that are provided by new entrants as a whole. We 
have then estimated the relationship between facility-based entry and service-based entry with 
the price of the local loop as moderator. All the estimations are obtained through dynamic 
panel data methodologies: Within-Group (WG), Least Squared Dummy Variable corrected 
(LSDVc) and difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMMd).  
  The paper is organized as follows. After a description of unbundling measures in 
telecommunications (Section 2), theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between 
unbundling and new entrants’ investment are reviewed (Section 3). The empirical strategy is 
discussed (Section 4) and subsequently the empirical findings are reported (Section 5). 
Finally, the paper presents some concluding remarks (Section 6). 
 
2. Local loop unbundling as an entry assistance measure 
  After liberalization (i.e. after 1998 in European countries), competition between 
incumbents and new entrants has developed in a patchy way. New entrants first entered the 
long distance and international markets, where prices were well above cost and investment in 
long distance networks was relatively cheap. With aggressive price strategies, new entrants 
gained a healthy market share in long distance and international markets. On the contrary, 
competition in the market of local connections and services did not develop to a significant 4 
 
                                                
degree because, on the basis of existing price levels, the local market was not sufficiently 
profitable, while the building of a proprietary local network required a huge investment
3.  
  The lack of competition became a strong concern among regulators with the coming 
and growing importance of the Internet that made the use of a local network necessary to 
provide innovative retail services. In order to foster competition in local markets, regulators 
throughout industrialized countries launched unbundling policies. The aim of unbundling 
policy is to enable the new entrants to take control of local networks to provide differentiated 
services and, as a final consequence, to spur competition. The first country that implemented 
unbundling obligations was the US in 1996 while in European countries it came into force in 
2001. 
  Absent unbundling, a firm can approach the local market through facility-based entry 
or resale. With facility-based entry, the new entrant has to build its own local network, a 
particularly slow and costly mode of entry. For this reason, in the last years particularly cable 
operators have relied upon this entry form and invested to upgrade their own network to 
provide also telecommunications services
4.  
  Alternatively, an entrant can buy the incumbent’s local services at a discounted 
wholesale rate and resell these services to its own customers. Resale is generally considered to 
be an easy way of creating “entry”, although the differentiation is limited to the marketing 
component. 
  However, under unbundling regime, the entrant’s choice set has enlarged. Entry 
through unbundling is a hybrid of facility-based and resale entry modes. Local loop 
 
3 In 1999, in OECD countries, the incumbent enjoyed more than a 97% market share in the local market except 
Australia, Canada, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, UK and US where new entrants had more than a 3% market 
share (OECD, 2000).  
4 However, Hoffler (2007) casts doubt on the total positive effect of facility-based competition. Indeed, in an 
empirical analysis, he showed that the welfare gains from the increase of penetration due to infrastructure 
competition seem not to be sufficiently large to overcompensate for the very high investments into the basically 
redundant alternative cable infrastructure. 5 
 
                                                
unbundling (LLU) can be classified into three main types (OECD, 2002): full local loop 
unbundling, shared local loop unbundling and bitstream access. 
  Full unbundling occurs when the incumbent leases the copper pair that connects a 
subscriber to the Main Distribution Frame (MDF). The new entrant takes total control of the 
copper pairs, and provides subscribers with all services, including voice. Line sharing allows 
the incumbent to maintain control of the copper pair, and continue providing some services to 
a subscriber, while allowing an access seeker to lease part of the copper pair spectrum and 
provide services to the same subscriber. Generally, line sharing allows the incumbent to 
continue providing services, while the competitor provides broadband (xDSL) services on the 
same copper pair. Finally, bitstream access relies upon the provision of a wholesale xDSL 
product by the incumbent. Unlike full unbundling and line sharing, the access seekers can 
only supply the services that the incumbent designates.  
  With unbundling, regulators provide some entry assistance that could help entrants to 
gain a larger market share and to build their own networks. The resale and unbundling entries 
(that we call service-based entry) give access to a different levels to incumbent’s network and 
this could provide a stepping stone to facility-based entry. According to the ladder of 
investment (LOI) theory that has been proposed by Cave (2006) regulator has to start from 
resale entry
5 and then has to enable the access to incumbent’s network at a higher level, e.g. 
bitstream access. Then, as the entrants’ customer base grows, they are encouraged to invest in 
the network elements necessary to pass this level. The next rung of the ladder is full or shared 
local loop unbundling and the last rung is the building of own local network, i.e. facility-
based entry. Implementing this approach is critical. An ill-designed action by the regulator 
could achieve the opposite outcome from the wished one, i.e. a substitution relationship 
between facility-based and service-based entry instead of a complementary one. Indeed, 
 
5 The theory suggests to start from the less replicable element of the incumbent’s network. Typically, resale entry 
is a level of access that requires a very little investment to provide services. 6 
 
                                                
lifting up to the next rung requires the existence of such next rung to step on (access to the 
incumbent’s infrastructure at a higher level at reasonable terms) and simultaneously burning 
up the preceding rung on the ladder (neutralizing the replacement effect created by the current 
level of access to the incumbent’s facility)
6. When the regulator does not neutralize the 
replacement effect, an entrant could not lift the rung, and service-based entry become 
substitute of facility-based entry. 
 
3. Research questions and empirical literature 
While empirical research has found a negative or null impact of unbundling obligations 
on incumbents’ investment (see for a review Cambini and Jiang, 2009), the growing literature 
on the relationship between LLU measures and new entrants’ investments in alternative 
networks has not yet reached a coherent body of results. As far as theories are concerned, 
according to the “ladder of investment” (LOI) view, service-based entry and facility-based 
entry are complements in promoting competition and development of broadband networks 
(Cave and Vogelsang, 2003; Cave, 2006; Avenali et al., 2010; Bourreau et al., 2010). 
However, Bourreau and Doğan (2005, 2006) showed that unbundling obligations delay the 
new entrants’ investment, due to a replacement effect. Yet, if the prospects of facility-based 
competition are weak, a transitory period of service-based competition is argued to encourage 
subsequent facility-based entry, because it allows new entrants to acquire a customer base and 
to learn about the market demand (“stepping stone effect”, Avenali et al., 2010; Bourreau and 




6 Recently, Bourreau et al. (2010) reviewing the literature on the ladder of investment approach, pointed out that 
the key assumptions underlying the LOI approach: service-based entry serves as a stepping stone to facility-
based entry if the replacement effect is neutralized and the regulator has the instruments to neutralize the 
replacement effect.   7 
 
                                                
PROPOSITION 1:  
a) The larger the experience cumulated by entrants through unbundling, the more likely their 
subsequent entry through investment in own alternative platforms (i.e. ladder of investment 
theory)  
b) The larger the experience cumulated by entrants through resale and bitstream access, the 
more likely their subsequent entry through unbundling (i.e. short ladder of investment theory) 
 
Transitory entry assistance should not be limited to the obligation to lease unbundled 
network elements. Bourreau and Doğan (2006) and Avenali et al. (2010) have showed that, in 
order to speed up the roll-out of alternative platforms, the regulator has to neutralize the 
replacement effect. To this aim an increase in the price charged for leased elements over time 
is critical. This result is confirmed also in the literature that looks at innovative race in new 
infrastructure building, i.e. Next Generation Network investment
7 (Hori and Mizuno, 2006, 
2009; Vareda and Hoernig, 2010). At the same time, Bourreau and Drouard (2010) point out 
that an increasing access charge is an effective way to promote investments only when the 
prospects of facility-based competition are strong enough. Otherwise a decreasing access 
charge is instead still necessary to strengthen service-based entry and, in the longer run, to 
encourage facility-based entry.  
 
PROPOSITION 2: If the local loop price increases over time, provided that service-based 
entry has already occurred to a certain degree, investment by entrants in alternative 
broadband platforms  is more likely (i.e. transitory entry assistance theory).   
 
Some empirical studies have recently analyzed the relationship between different forms 
of local loop regulation and broadband penetration, and have generally confirmed the 
 
7 This literature is related to the R&D race (see Katz and Shapiro, 1987). 8 
 
hypothesis that firms are more likely to use the incumbent’s local loops instead of building 
new platforms if the option is available to them, even if they could potentially deploy their 
own network systems. Grajek and Röller (2009), based on a sample of 70 firms in 20 
European countries during the 1997-2006 period, found that pro-entry regulation through 
LLU requirements has discouraged industry-level investment. Similarly, Wallsten and 
Hausladen (2009), using a sample of 27 European countries observed from 2002 through 
2007, found that unbundling lines are associated with fewer fiber connections provided by 
both entrants and incumbents. Bouckaert et al. (2010) have analyzed the evolution of 
broadband penetration in 20 OECD countries from 2003 to 2008, and have confirmed the 
view that the promotion of inter-platform competition instead of LLU obligations is likely to 
be a more effective policy to improve the broadband penetration.  
  Hazlett and Bazelon (2005) investigated the relationship between service-based entry 
and facility-based entry, using US state-level data, observed form 1999 to 2004. They found 
that unbundled lines in a state in one period do not affect the facility-based lines in that state 
in future periods, providing no empirical support for the stepping stone theory. Moreover, 
they showed that incumbent’s investment declines as mandatory unbundling was enacted, 
favoring the cable operators’ investment.  
  Crandall and Sidak (2007) tested a “short ladder of investment” theory in European 
countries, through descriptive yet insightful analysis. For each country, they examined 
whether LLU lines as a percentage of total new entrants’ lines had increased over time, i.e. 
they considered LLU as the last rang of the ladder. They did not include facility-based 
competition in the analysis because at that time there has been little investment by entrants in 
their own last-mile facilities. Using the European Competitive Telecommunication 
Association (ECTA) data, they found that LLU lines increased as a percentage of new 
entrants’ lines between July 2002 and September 2006 in nine of the fifteen European 
countries. As far as the remaining six countries are concerned, they concluded that the ladder 9 
 
 
                                                
of investment approach was not well implemented
8. For the nine countries that have 
experienced an increasing LLU lines over time, the authors stated that only France and Italy
9 
offered a genuine support to the ladder of investment theory. The two countries had little or 
no competition by cable operators. With these exceptions, empirical evidence from Europe 
does not seem to support the stepping-stone hypothesis. A recent paper by Bacache et al. 
(2011) has used data on 15 European countries, observed from 2002 through 2009 on a semi-
annual basis. They have tested the ladder of investment theory and they have found that 
service-based entry does not affect facility-based entry. This result seems to be stable after 
some robustness checks
10. Similarly to Crandall and Sidak (2007), they have assumed that 
unbundling entry is the last rung of the ladder. For this “short” ladder of investment, they 
found that a phase of pure service-based entry, i.e. bitstream and resale access, is helpful to 
spur entry through full or shared access unbundling. 
  Other papers have tried to assess empirically the validity of the transitory entry 
assistance theory. A cross-section analysis of Crandall et al. (2004) studied the impact of local 
loop price on infrastructure investment by Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLEC) in 
the US, through state-level data for the years 2000 and 2001. They found that the share of 
facility-based CLEC lines is higher in the states where the rental rates for unbundling network 
elements (UNE) are higher
11. 
  Waverman et al. (2007) analyzed the relationship between the price of the local loop 
and investment in 27 European countries observed from 2002 to 2006. They estimated a 
system of two equations. The first equation used as a dependent variable the market share of 
 
8 For instance, the implementation of LOI approach in Germany has been a failure, because bitstream and resale 
access was made available after local loop unbundling. As many successful German entrants were present in the 
market after the LLU and before the resale and bitstream access, it proved that providing resale as the first rung 
of the ladder was unnecessary. 
9 For these two countries, LLU lines overtaked the sum of bitstream and resale lines at some point in the sample 
period. From their analysis, only Iliad, in France, and Tiscali and Wind, in Italy, have moved up the path from 
bitstream to LLU. 
10 They have estimated the model after controlling for time dummies, the number of rungs available jointly, the 
regulatory performance, the development of cable modem and the evolution of local loop prices. 
11 However, this analysis does not allow us to draw some conclusions on the relationship between the evolution 
of the access charge and new entrants’ investment, because it’s a cross-section analysis.  10 
 
                                                
alternative operators
12. The second equation used as a the dependent variable the market share 
of DSL lines offered by competitors. They found that a reduction of the local loop price yields 
a reduction of the market share of overall alternative lines and an increase of the market share 
of competitors’ DSL lines. In other words, a trade-off seems to be associated with LLU 
regulation. Intra-platform competition might be achieved at the expense of longer term inter-
platform competition.  
  Distaso et al. (2009) analyzed the regulatory approach adopted in 12 European 
Countries from 2005 to 2007 and confirmed that only some regulators have adopted policies 
that have favored the migration from bitstream-based entry to unbundling-based entry. A 
graphical analysis showed that in France and Spain a decrease of the ratio between wholesale 
LLU price and bitstream price is associated with an increase of the share of LLU services 
with respect to the share of bitstream services.  
  Our empirical analysis wants to improve the previous research along two lines. A first 
contribution is related to methodology. As the time span of our sample is longer than most 
part of previous empirical papers, we can estimate dynamic panel models with appropriate 
estimators. The second contribution that we want to add refers to a deeper analysis on the 
relationship between the price of the local loop and investments, because with the notable 
exception of Waverman et al. (2007), little attention has been dedicated to this topic.  
 
4. Methodology and sample 
  A broad evidence on the relationship between different service-based competition 
instruments and the diffusion of broadband networks can be obtained through the joint use of 
bivariate and multivariate dynamic panel models. In order to test the ladder of investment 
theory (and the short ladder of investment theory) we have specified an equation similar to 
that proposed by Bacache et al. (2011). The main difference is that our equation has a 
 
12 The market share of alternative operators is defined as the ratio between the sum of all broadband lines offered 
through alternative platforms and the total broadband lines in the country.   11 
 
dynamic specification and thus we have employed dynamic panel data estimators. Moreover, 
given the dynamic specification of the estimated models, we have tested the potential 
presence of unit roots in the dependent variables. In order to test the transitory assistance 
theory (Proposition 2) we have estimated a very similar model modified to include the local 
loop price and the interaction term between the local loop price and service-based entry 
variables. Different dynamic panel data estimators have been employed to give robustness of 
the obtained results (see Section 4.2).  
 
 4.1  Data 
The two theoretical propositions are tested on a sample of 27 European countries (2002-2009 
period on a semi-annual base). We have collected data on the broadband lines of incumbents, 
on the one hand, and new entrants as a whole, on the other one. We have also built a set of 
LLU policy indicators (e.g. full unbundled loop price, shared access obligations, and so on). 
Data have been sourced from the reports of Communication Committee and the EC reviews 
of communications regulatory package. In the analysis we consider two different modes of 
service-based entry (as proposed by Bouckaert et al., 2010, and Bacache et al., 2011): a pure 
service-based entry (Psbe), where entrants are merely reselling the incumbent’s services, and 
therefore incur few investments themselves (bitstream or resale entry); a service-based entry 
(Sbe), where entrants lease unbundled local loop elements, but have to invest incrementally in 
own equipment (full or shared access unbundling entry). In addition, a total service-based 
entry (Tsbe) variable is constructed as the sum of Psbe and Sbe variables. The variable for 
facility-based entry is Fbe that is the sum of the total broadband lines provided by Wireless 
Local Loop (WLL), Fiber and Power Line Communications (PLC) technologies. We have 
excluded cable technology because it is little likely that an entrant that has utilized the 
incumbent’s network  to provide retail services later deploys a cable network (Bacache et at., 
2011).  Pll represents the local loop price, i.e. is the monthly average total cost of the local loop, as 
provided by the EC reviews of communications regulatory package. It is defined as the sum 
of monthly fee and connection fee amortized over three years.  
In addition we have collected data on some control variables. Market structure is proxied 
through IncShare, that is the ratio between broadband lines provided by the incumbent and 
total broadband lines in the country. Gdpcap, i.e. GDP per capita, is meant to control for the 
economic growth of the country and the demand for broadband infrastructure. The penetration 
of personal computers (PcPen) and mobile devices (MobPen) are also used to describe the 
demand of telecommunication services. Data are sourced from ICT Communications 2010 
provided by ITU. Finally, difference in construction costs between countries are taken into 
account through Dens, i.e. the population density of countries. Table 1 reports the definition 
and the sources of our variables. Table 2 and 3 report the descriptive statistics and the 





4.2 Models  
  In order to test Proposition 1a (i.e. ladder of investment theory, Section 3) we have 
estimated the following model: 
         1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , , t i t i t i t i t i MobPen IncShare Sbe Fbe Fbe      
t i t i t i t i t i Gdpcap Dens PcPen , , , 1 ,                                          (1)                        
where  i   and   t   are the unobservable country-specific and time-specific characteristics and  
t i,  is the i.i.d. disturbance term. The lagged dependent variable takes into account the 
persistence of the facility-based entry. If the coefficient α is found to be positive and 
12 
 significantly different from 0, it means that service-based entry in one period positively 
affects facility-based entry in later periods, confirming the ladder of investment theory
13. We 
have also added some control variables: IncShare, MobPen, PcPen, Gdpcap and Dens
14. In 
addition, we have estimated the equation (1) adding the variable Psbe and replacing Sbe with 
the variable Tsbe. 
  Proposition 1b (i.e. short ladder of investment theory, Section 3) is tested by 
estimating the following model:  
         1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , , t i t i t i t i t i MobPen IncShare Psbe Sbe Sbe      
t i t i t i t i t i Gdpcap Dens PcPen , , , 1 ,                                          (2)    
where  i   and   t   are the unobservable country-specific and time-specific characteristics and  
t i,  is the i.i.d. disturbance term. Model (2) is similar to model (1), with Sbe as dependent 
variable and Psbe variable as explaining variable. If coefficient α is positive and significant 
then entry through unbundling is favored by a previous entry through resale or bitstream 
access.   
  In order to test Proposition 2 we have estimated the following model: 
            1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , , * t i t i t i t i t i t i t i MobPen IncShare Sbe Pll Pll Fbe Fbe       
t i t i t i t i t i Gdpcap Dens PcPen , , , 1 ,                                          (3)   
where  i   and   t   are the unobservable country-specific and time-specific characteristics and  
t i,  is the i.i.d. disturbance term. Model (3) is similar to models (1)-(2) with Fbe as dependent 
variable and Pll and its interaction with Sbe as key independent variables. 
                                                 
13 The coefficient α represents the short-run effect of a shock of Sbe variable on Fbe. However, the effect 







14 The variable IncShare, MobPen and PcPen could be endogenous to the dependent variable and thus we use the 
lagged of the variables in the estimated model.   14 
 
                                                
  In order to check the robustness of results equations (1), (2) and (3) have been 
estimated with three different estimators that rely on different assumptions. The Within Group 
(WG) estimator takes into account the country fixed effects, but it assumes that all the 
independent variables are exogenous. As the lagged dependent variable is clearly an 
endogenous variable (see for instance Wooldridge, 2002), we have used two further 
estimators that control for the endogeneity: the Least Square Dummies Variable corrected 
(LSDVc), proposed by Bruno (2005) and the Difference Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMMd), proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). While the LSDVc estimator takes into 
account the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable and it’s well suited for small 
sample, it continues to assume that the other independent variables are exogenous. At the 
same time, the GMMd estimator enables us to take into account that all the independent 
variables could be endogenous in the model but it would require a large sample to perform 
well.  
  Before estimating models of interest we have verified if the dependent variables are 
stationary or not. The literature on the test of unit root in a panel data context is recent but 
abundant (Breitung and Pesaran, 2008). We adopt two different tests, namely those of Levin 
et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003)
15. If the tests accept together the hypothesis of unit root, we 
will estimate the model using the differenced variable rather than the variable in level. 
 
5. Results 
The results of the unit root tests are reported by Table 4
16. The null hypothesis (i.e.  
presence of unit root or non-stationarity of the analyzed variable) cannot be rejected when Fbe 
and Sbe variables are considered. The test statistics are not significantly different from 0 
 
15 The common feature of all the tests is that the time dimension of the panel data is relatively large compare to 
the sample dimension. In our study, the panel has a moderate size in terms of time and sample dimensions, and 
we have applied more than one test to have more stable and robust results.  
16 All the variables are standardized in order to have more comparable coefficients. The same results, in terms of 
signs and significance, are obtained not standardizing the variables. 15 
 
(Table 4). Indeed Sbe variable passed the Levin, Lin and Chu test, but it did not pass the Im, 
Pesaran and Shin test. We have decided to adopt a caution approach and we have concluded 
that both Fbe and Sbe variables cannot be regarded as stationary. We have then tested the 
stationarity of Fbe and Sbe differenced variables and tests rejected the null hypothesis. As a 
result, Fbe and Sbe differenced variables have been used as dependent variables in models 
(1)-(3).  
[Table 4] 
  We have estimated equation (1) with the differenced variable Fbe as dependent 
variable (Table 5). 
[Table 5] 
The coefficient of lagged dependent variable is positive and significantly different from 
0, according WG and LSDVc estimators (at 5% and 1% significance levels respectively). 
Innovations in the facility-based entry variable are persistent. As regards our key independent 
variable (Sbe) the coefficient has been found not to play a significant role. A similar result is 
obtained when pure service-based entry or only total service-based entry are also considered 
(see the Appendix, Table A1). This means that service-based entry does not encourage 
facility-based entry, casting some doubts on the empirical validity of LOI theory and leading 
us to reject Proposition 1a. The coefficients related to control variables are not significant.  
Table 6 reports our estimates of model (2) with the differenced variable Sbe as a 
dependent variable, according to the unit root analysis (Table 4).  
[Table 6] 
As expected, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive and 
significantly different from 0 (i.e. WG, GMMd and LSDVc coefficients are significantly 
different from 0 at 1% significance level). Psbe is found to have a positive and significant 
impact on ΔSbe (at 1% significance level). A phase of pure service based competition through 
bitstream and resale entry modes encourages the entrants to switch to offer the services by 16 
 
                                                
renting full or shared unbundled elements. The short ladder of investment theory is thus 
confirmed by our results and Proposition 1b is accepted on an empirical ground. 
The results of empirical analysis do not confirm Proposition 1a: service-based entry 
does not encourage facility-based entry. By contrast, a first phase of pure service-based entry, 
i.e. through bitstream access and resale, has been shown to lead to service-based entry in  later 
periods (Proposition 1b). If the regulator aims at the development of full facility-based 
competition, it will not be through service-based competition that this goal will be reached.  
  In order to investigate the Proposition 2, we have estimated the model (3) and Table 7 
reports the results.  
[Table 7] 
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive and significant, with the 
exception of GMMd estimate, showing a persistence of the series over time. The estimated 
coefficients of both Pll and its interaction term with Sbe are negative. The local loop price 
seems to have a negative relationship with the development of alternative platforms, as 
represented by Fbe, whatever the level of previous service-based entry. We expected that both 
Pll and its interaction term with Sbe coefficients were positive instead (Proposition 2). 
However, it should be emphasized that coefficients of linear Pll term and its interaction with 
Sbe are not significantly different from 0, with the possible exception of GMMd estimate of 
Pll linear term. The explanation of this result could be, as Bourreau and Drouard (2010) point 
out, that when facility-based competition is a long-term perspective
17, a decreasing rather than 
increasing local loop price is necessary to strengthen service-based entry and, in the longer 
run, to encourage facility-based entry
18.  
 
17 In our sample, the facility-based lines represent only the 14% of the total broadband lines in 2009. 
18 However, in the Appendix (Table A2) we present the results obtained estimating the model (3) using service-
based entry  instead of facility-based entry variable as a dependent variable. The coefficient related to the local 
loop price is negative and not significantly different from 0. We then conclude that the regulated price of leased 
network elements seems to be an irrelevant factor when competition, whether service or facility based, is the 
issue.  17 
 
This result is puzzling from our perspective. On the one hand, it might be argued that 
facility-based entry is feasible only over a dramatically long time horizon. This view would 
lead to conclude that any efforts made by the regulatory authority to implement a transitory 
entry assistance is over optimistic, given the present status of industry and technology. On the 
other hand, it might be argued that local loop price decisions adopted by the regulator are 
mainly targeted to favor Sbe, exactly because facility-based entry is assumed not to be 
feasible in the short-medium term.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed the impact of the unbundling policies on new entrants’ 
broadband investment. Two main research questions have been explored. First, we have 
investigated the ladder of investment theory, that is, whether an early phase of service-based 
entry (pure service-based entry) has favored facility-based entry (service-based entry) in later 
periods. Second, we have examined the transitory nature of entry assistance, i.e. if facility-
based entry tracks changes in the price of the local loop.   
The empirical analysis is carried out on a sample of 27 European countries observed 
from 2002 to 2009. The theoretical prepositions have been tested through the use of 
multivariate dynamic panel models.  
As to the first research question, empirical findings suggest that service-based entry 
does not encourage facility-based entry. These results casts some doubts on the empirical 
validity of LOI theory. Instead, we have found support for the short-ladder of investment 
theory. If regulators and policymakers want to have, in the long run, full facility-based 
competition in the industry, unbundling obligations do not seem to be the best instrument.  
Finally, our results do not support the view that an increase in local loop price favor 
facility-based entry. On the contrary, empirical evidence seems to suggest that local loop price 
are negatively related to facility-based entry. It could be that facility-based competition in our 18 
 
sample is a long-term perspective and so a decreasing local loop price entails the deployment 
of facility-based platforms in the long run (Bourreau and Drouard, 2010).  
We are aware of same limitations of our empirical analysis, among which the relatively 
small size of our sample, particularly in the longitudinal dimension, is the most notable. 
Nonetheless, we are quite confident that our results, albeit preliminary, are rather robust 
because of the multiplicity of adopted methodologies. Our final remarks are the followings. It 
can be argued that competition within the same infrastructure, i.e. service-based entry, has 
been the dominant market structure so far, at least when entrants have cumulated large 
experience with resale and bitstream access. Among unbundling policies, obligations to lease 
local loops can be regarded just as an accompanying measure with respect to pure service-
based entry. At this stage of research we are left with the question about motives why we have 
not found any relationship between local loop regulation and the development of alternative 
platforms. First, local loop regulation both unbundling obligations and local loop price may be 
ill-designed or ill-implemented. Second, theories suggesting that these regulations have 
impact on entrants incentives to invest in own advanced networks rely upon incomplete or 
partly unrealistic assumptions. For instance, the maturity degree of broadband technologies 
may still be too small and facility-based entry should be deferred to a very long term or the 
organization of communications industry may meet difficulties and failures related to indirect 
network effects and agreements between content providers, service providers and network 
operators should rather be relied upon. Finally, we cannot exclude that additional 
accompanying measures may make the difference, as for instance public-private partnership 
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Table 1 – List of variables 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
Sbe  Total	number	of	Unbundled	and	Shared	lines	 European Commission
Psbe  Total	number	of	Bitsteam	and	Resale	lines	 European Commission 
Tsbe  Sum	of	Sbe	and	Psbe	variables  European Commission 
Fbe  Total	number	of	WLL,	Fiber	and	PLC	lines	 European Commission




Gdpcap  Gross Domestic Product per capita  ITU 
MobPen  Mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants  ITU 
PcPen  Number	of	Pc	per	100	inhabitants	 ITU 
Dens  Population	over	the	area	of	the	country	 OECD 
 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics on broadband lines by new entrants (country-level data) 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Fbe 405  75506.7  177810.2  0  1466100 
Sbe 405  420686.9  1210634  0  8314000 
Psbe 405  319329  841072.7  0  5567158 
Pll 405  10.696  5.241  0  26 
 
 
Table 3 – Correlation matrix 
 
  Fbe  Sbe Psbe  Pll IncShare MobPen PcPen Dens Gdpcap 
Fbe 1.00                  
Sbe -0.03  1.00               
Psbe  -0.06 0.72 1.00             
Pll 0.03  -0.01  0.02  1.00           
IncShare -0.32 -0.12 -0.25  0.12  1.00         
MobPen 0.28 0.16 0.15 0.30  -0.02  1.00       
PcPen  0.03 0.31 0.29 0.38  0.02  0.51  1.00     
Dens -0.13  0.02  0.03  -0.07 -0.20 -0.10  0.14  1.00     













Table 4 – Unit root tests 
 
  Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003)   
Fbe -0.002    -0.236   
ΔFbe -0.333***   -1.864**   
Sbe -0.047***    -1.336   
ΔSbe -0.220***   -1.772*   
Pll -0.413  ***    -2.389***   
 
Note: The null hypothesis is the presence of unit root.  ***, **, and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of <1%, <5% and <10%. 
 
 
Table 5 – Facility-based lines of new entrants (ladder of investment theory) 
 
  (WG) (GMMd) (LSDVc)
1 ,   t i Fbe   0.271** -0.041 0.355***
  (0.117) (0.223)  (0.066) 
      
1 ,  t i Sbe   -0.005 -0.027  -0.005 
  (0.059) (0.083)  (0.098) 
      
1 ,  t i IncShare   0.060 -0.078  0.062 
  (0.059) (0.074)  (0.094) 
      
1 ,  t i MobPen   0.185 -0.100  0.193 
  (0.119) (0.161)  (0.138) 
      
1 ,  t i PcPen   0.133 -0.378  0.149 
  (0.286) (0.423)  (0.285) 
      
Dens -5.121*  -5.026  -4.512 
  (2.888) (6.504)  (4.224) 
      
Gdpcap 0.220  -0.438  0.116 
  (0.487) (0.928)  (0.544) 
N  349 322  349 
ar1   -1.035   
ar1p   0.301   
ar2   -0.905   
ar2p   0.365   
Hansen   3.059   
Hansenp   0.548   
 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of <1%, <5% and <10%. All estimates include 
year dummies (coefficients are omitted from the table). (1) AR(1) and AR(2) are tests of the null hypothesis of, respectively, no first- or 
23 
 second-order serial correlation. Hansen is a test of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. (2) Bootstrapped standard errors are based 









Table 6 – Service-based lines of new entrants (short ladder of investment theory) 
  
 (WG)  (GMMd) (LSDVc)
1 ,   t i Sbe   0.550*** 0.433*** 0.735***
  (0.076) (0.151) (0.062) 
     
1 ,  t i Psbe   0.066*** 0.083*** 0.042***
  (0.016) (0.020) (0.008) 
     
1 ,  t i IncShare   0.001 -0.000 0.002 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
     
1 ,  t i MobPen   0.002 0.006 -0.000 
  (0.005) (0.016) (0.010) 
     
1 ,  t i PcPen   -0.004 -0.005 0.000 
  (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) 
     
Dens 0.148  0.222  -0.050 
  (0.107) (1.176) (0.251) 
     
Gdpcap  0.004 0.019 0.005 
  (0.013) (0.083) (0.029) 
N  347 320 347 
ar1   -1.014   
ar1p   0.310  
ar2   -0.229   
ar2p   0.819  
Hansen   11.743  
Hansenp   0.962  
 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of <1%, <5% and <10%. All estimates include 
year dummies (coefficients are omitted from the table). (1) AR(1) and AR(2) are tests of the null hypothesis of, respectively, no first- or 
second-order serial correlation. Hansen is a test of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. (2) Bootstrapped standard errors are based 



















Table 7 – Price of local loop and facility-based entry 
 
  (WG) (GMMd) (LSDVc) (WG) (GMMd)  (LSDVc)
1 ,   t i Fbe   0.273** 0.306 0.362*** 0.270** 0.400 0.361***
  (0.116) (0.231)  (0.066) (0.118) (0.331)  (0.066) 
           
1 ,  t i Pll   -0.006 -0.048*  -0.004  -0.020  -0.054** -0.017 
  (0.018) (0.024)  (0.024) (0.030) (0.027)  (0.040) 
           
1 , 1 , *   t i t i Sbe Pll        -0.049  -0.012  -0.046 
       (0.067)  (0.056)  (0.109) 
          
1 ,  t i IncShare   0.019 0.016  0.020 0.016 0.030  0.017 
  (0.020) (0.021)  (0.028) (0.018) (0.028)  (0.028) 
           
1 ,  t i MobPen   0.050 -0.001  0.051  0.049 0.017  0.050 
  (0.032) (0.029)  (0.037) (0.032) (0.046)  (0.038) 
           
1 ,  t i PcPen   0.037 -0.129  0.041  0.041  -0.200* 0.045 
  (0.076) (0.081)  (0.073) (0.080) (0.121)  (0.074) 
           
Dens -1.292*  -19.451  -1.137  -1.346*  -2.452  -1.183 
  (0.721) (22.083)  (1.120)  (0.769)  (1.996)  (1.146) 
           
Gdpcap  0.053 0.158  0.026 0.063 0.263  0.034 
  (0.122) (0.260)  (0.134) (0.130) (0.331)  (0.137) 
N  349 322  349 349 322  349 
ar1   -1.473     -1.240   
ar1p   0.141     0.215   
ar2   0.042      -0.496   
ar2p   0.966     0.620   
Hansen   5.460     0.243   
Hansenp   1.000     0.622   
 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of <1%, <5% and <10%. All estimates include 
year dummies (coefficients are omitted from the table). (1) AR(1) and AR(2) are tests of the null hypothesis of, respectively, no first- or 
second-order serial correlation. Hansen is a test of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. (2) Bootstrapped standard errors are based 

















Table A1 – Facility-based lines of new entrants  
 
    (WG)  (GMMd) (LSDVc)  (WG)  (GMMd) (LSDVc) 
1 ,   t i Fbe    0.272**  -0.084  0.365*** 0.270**  0.059  0.362*** 
    (0.116)  (0.306) (0.064) (0.116)  (0.199) (0.062) 
           
1 ,  t i Sbe    -0.116  -0.430  -0.106       
   (0.102)  (0.303)  (0.153)       
           
1 ,  t i Psbe    -0.076  -0.163  -0.070       
   (0.059)  (0.127)  (0.091)       
           
1 ,  t i Tsbe          -0.007  -0.035  -0.006 
         (0.016)  (0.023)  (0.028) 
              
1 ,  t i IncShare     0.007  -0.001 0.008 0.013  -0.009 0.014 
    (0.017)  (0.015) (0.028) (0.016)  (0.022) (0.027) 
           
1 ,  t i MobPen     0.050  0.002 0.053 0.048  0.002 0.050 
    (0.031)  (0.043) (0.044) (0.031)  (0.043) (0.044) 
           
1 ,  t i PcPen     0.033  -0.138 0.038 0.032  -0.156 0.037 
    (0.074)  (0.100) (0.075) (0.075)  (0.108) (0.074) 
           
Dens    -1.295*  -0.861 -1.086  -1.321*  -1.529 -1.148 
    (0.735)  (1.055) (0.936) (0.727)  (1.539) (0.937) 
           
Gdpcap   0.049  0.091  0.022  0.051  -0.001  0.021 
    (0.127)  (0.297) (0.138) (0.128)  (0.236) (0.138) 
N    349  322 349 347  320 347 
ar1      -0.869     -1.186  
ar1p      0.385     0.236  
ar2      -0.967     -0.795  
ar2p      0.333     0.426  
Hansen      8.192     2.188  
Hansenp      0.224     0.701  
 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of <1%, <5% and <10%. All estimates include 
year dummies (coefficients are omitted from the table). (1) AR(1) and AR(2) are tests of the null hypothesis of, respectively, no first- or 
second-order serial correlation. Hansen is a test of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. (2) Bootstrapped standard errors are based 















Table A2 – Local loop price and service-based lines of new entrants  
 
  (WG) (GMMd)  (LSDVc) 
1 ,   t i Sbe   0.772*** 0.597*** 0.979*** 
  (0.070) (0.128) (0.070) 
     
1 ,  t i Pll   -0.003 0.003 -0.003 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
     
1 ,  t i IncShare   -0.019 -0.018 0.002 
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.007) 
     
1 ,  t i MobPen   0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.010) 
     
1 ,  t i PcPen   -0.000 -0.001 0.009 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.021) 
     
Dens  0.167 -0.039 0.154 
  (0.123) (0.971) (0.319) 
     
Gdpcap  -0.015 0.027 -0.004 
  (0.016) (0.061) (0.033) 
N  349 322 349 
ar1   -1.068   
ar1p   0.285  
ar2   -0.121   
ar2p   0.903  
Hansen   14.325   
Hansenp   0.890  
 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of <1%, <5% and <10%. All estimates include 
year dummies (coefficients are omitted from the table). (1) AR(1) and AR(2) are tests of the null hypothesis of, respectively, no first- or 
second-order serial correlation. Hansen is a test of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. (2) Bootstrapped standard errors are based 
on 50 replications. Coefficients from the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator are used as initial parameters. The chosen approximation is 
O(1/NT^2). 
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